Introduction
The theme of this conference, "masculinities and institutions", may seem a quiet one, compared with other topics in investigations of masculinity -violence, technology, sex, gender-bending or epidemics. We don't seem to hear much small-arms fire or smell much greasepaint here. Instead we seem to be making a morning-coffee call on the man without qualities, the organization man, the man in the grey flannel suit.
Yet the theme is important, and as we shall see it does involve the small-arms and the greasepaint as well as the grey flannel suit. Studying institutions is a vital step in the understanding of men and masculinities, and for that matter women and femininities.
It is a step we need to take, to get beyond the psychological essentialism and categorical thinking -the "boys in a box" rhetoric -that besets media discussion of the problems of gender, and all too much academic work. Reckoning with institutions is also, I will argue, crucial for getting beyond the limits of the most influential contemporary school of gender theory.
To understand the world we live in, its routine life and its gigantic problems -the most banal sitcom on US television, the horrifying conflict in Darfur, the process of global warming -we must examine the institutions enmeshed in producing them, and the way those institutions work. Institutions like the transnational corporation, the sociotechnical system of televised entertainment, the Chinese and Sudanese state, the knowledge-producing machinery of modern science, must be our concern.
And all those institutions are gendered. All have internal gender regimes, all function in a wider context (now of course a global context) of gender relations, all produce gender effects. If we want to change the way they function -to prevent war and genocide, to slow down global warming, to pursue social justice, or even to make a small increase in public understanding of what is going on -we must address those gender issues.
In this paper I will reflect on how our knowledge of "masculinities and institutions" has grown, what broad conclusions in the field we can regard as well established, what difficulties have appeared in this body of knowledge, and what new directions are perhaps emerging. I will end with thoughts on two promising lines of analysis, one concerned with neoliberal globalization, and one concerned with men who make institutions work for gender equality.
In the social sciences, the term "institution" has two main meanings. In the narrower sense, as when we talk about a school or a bank as an institution, it means much the same as "organization". In the broader sense, as when we talk about the institution of marriage or property, it means a deeply-rooted pattern of practice that gives a general form to the life of a society. I will sometimes refer to this second meaning, but my main focus will be on the first, as I examine research on gender in organizational life.
Masculinities in organizational life
The idea that there is a connection between particular versions of masculinity and particular organizational settings is by no means new. At the start of this paper I quoted Raymond Chandler's famous description of Los Angeles homicide cops, as seen by the private eye Philip Marlowe. They are just letting him go after an interrogation, and he is uncertain of his ground -as they want him to be. The image of "hard" masculinity (the word is three times repeated) is unforgettable, and Chandler is a good enough sociologist to show the reason for it. The passage goes on:
What would you expect them to be? Civilization had no meaning for them. All they saw of it was the failures, the dirt, the dregs, the aberrations and the disgust.
It is not hard to find literary accounts of other masculinities in their organizational contexts, though not often as brilliantly condensed as this. One thinks of the uncertain soldiers in Stephen Crane's The Red Badge of Courage and Heinrich Böll's The Train Was On Time, the flamboyant bankers in Christina Stead's House of All Nations, the crafty academics in Kingsley Amis' Lucky Jim, and so on.
We might say, then, that this gender connection is a familiar piece of cultural knowledge; though it was massively ignored in organization theory and research until the impact of the Women's Liberation movement. It then leapt into view. One of the most interesting texts of that time was Michael Korda's Male Chauvinism (1973) , a journalistic but perceptive account of the sexual politics of New York office life, detailing middle-class men's attempts to protect their prestige and power in the face of challenges from women.
During the 1970s, as we all know, the feminist challenge was institutionalized within organizational life, in this country and around the world, by an equal-opportunity and human-rights agenda including anti-discrimination rules and support programmes for women and girls. Thus the practical challenge to men's privileges was sustained, and this kept generating problems about men and masculinity that called for research. In the 1980s, a stream of organizational research on this issue began to flow, and it has kept flowing to the present.
I would like to recall several high points of this research, since the methods matter. Cynthia Cockburn's Brothers, which appeared in 1983, set a formidably high standard from the start. This was an ethnography of English compositors, i.e. printing workers, centred on the problem of how and why men had kept exclusive control of this occupation despite radical changes in technology and social context. It showed the interweaving of class-conscious solidarity and masculine self-image, the gendered rituals of membership, and the re-interpretation of technology along gender lines. Very importantly, it went beyond the present into the history of the industry, showing that masculine domination was in no sense "natural" but had been produced over the past century by the exclusion of women printing workers.
Moving to the global periphery, we find another classic industrial ethnography, Dunbar Moodie's Going for Gold (1994) . This is about the black miners in South Africa who won the fabulous wealth of the Witwatersrand. This study also traces the history of the industry, showing the technical circumstances and industrial politics of working vast low-grade ore deposits, requiring a large workforce. It adds two more dimensions. One is the racial politics of colonialism that created this workforce, the other is relations between the workplace and the sexual and domestic lives of the workers. In these dimensions, revealed in interviews by Vivienne Ndatshe, the study uncovers three remarkable dynamics of masculinity. One is the creation of "mine marriages" between men in the migrant workers' compounds. The second is the "women with masculinity" who ran the rural homesteads in the absence of their husbands and embodied a traditional concept of masculinity as responsible and caring homestead management. The third is the mineworkers' turn, in the proletarianization of the 1970s and 1980s, towards a conception of manhood as individual toughness and dominance, adopting a breadwinner model and losing the older reciprocity with women.
The problem of gender reciprocity is also a central theme in Yuko Ogasawara's Office Ladies and Salaried Men (1998) , a lovely participant-observation and interview study of life in a Japanese bank in the 1990s. In this institution there is a near-absolute gender division of labour, with the men on a management career ladder, and women performing non-career service roles. Vastly better paid, embodying the archetypal "salaryman" version of middle-class masculinity, the men would seem to have nearabsolute power. But Ogasawara shows this is not the case. The men are subject to constant criticism among the women, and depend on them for services vital to their own advancement. Therefore they curry favour, for instance in gift-giving rituals, and are generally restrained in dealing with women subordinates -raw authority does not play well.
These are three among the high points -I could have chosen others -in a substantial research literature. We now have a small library of studies of gender formation in masculine occupational groups: police, firemen, managers, engineers, steelworkers, forestry workers, and so on (e.g. Donaldson 1991 , Hall et al. 2007 ). We also have many studies of the gender regimes of workplaces and other institutions, in which the position of men and the norms of masculinity come into focus; some of these are, but some are not, heavily masculinized. They include studies of schools, the military, factories, prisons, farms, hospitals, and others (e.g. Mac an Ghaill 1994 , Corman et al. 1993 . These are now well-established and productive research genres, mostly using a combination of field observation and focussed interviewing. Some very effectively use historical and statistical techniques to develop a picture of an industry and its workforce, and thus place gender formation in a macro-social setting.
It is important, especially for English-speaking people in the global metropole, to know that this is a world-wide research effort. Such studies are by no means confined to North America and Europe. Among the most important studies of managerial masculinities are those that examine the rise, development and crisis of the "salaryman" model, including its deployment abroad as Japanese corporations went multinational (Dasgupta 2003 , Taga 2004 . Military masculinities have been studied in a number of countries, where the armed forces play rather different cultural roles. An excellent example is military service in Turkey, where since the days of Kemal Atatürk the army has played a nation-building, secularizing, and authoritarian role that brings it into tension with popular culture. The familiar processes of forming masculinity in military induction and training -"boot camp" -here take on a particularly combative shape (Sinclair-Webb 2000) .
Research on prison masculinities is active in the United States, which has the biggest prison system in the world, but is also found elsewhere. For instance, a recent study in South Africa traces a stark gender polarization among the men of the welldeveloped prison gangs. Not one but two gender hierarchies are produced, one among the violent power-holders among the prisoners, the other among the "wyfies", their feminized sexual partners (Sabo et al. 2001 , Gear 2005 . Research on factories is also international. A recent study of auto component plants in Argentina deconstructs the ideology of "machismo" among factory workers, shows the interplay among four images of masculinity and the way they operate to constrain women's economic access. Disturbingly, this study argues that the images are shared by the women in the factories too (Stobbe 2005 ).
Most of this literature is empirical investigation framed by concepts drawn from theories of gender, or from theorists such as Foucault. However there is also conceptual thinking specifically about gender in organizations. Like other fields of social science, this has evolved over time. In the early days of equal opportunity campaigns, studies like Rosabeth Kanter's much-cited Men and Women of the Corporation (1977) relied on categorical thinking about gender, and a concept of social process that did not go much beyond role theory and attitude change. Since then, several lines of thought have developed.
A British school of organization studies, influenced by labour process research and structuralist ideas of gender, is well represented by the important collection Men as Managers, Managers as Men, edited by two leading researchers in the field, David Collinson and Jeff Hearn (1996) . This approach has been carried forward in the journal Gender, Work & Organization. In time, it has come to be more influenced by post-structuralist ideas, so many recent studies concern discourses of gender. Nevertheless one of the most important concepts to emerge recently is a materialist one. Miriam Glucksmann (2000) argues that gender divisions in the workplace must be analyzed within the "total social organization of labour", which sees home, workplace and other sites not as separate spheres but as part of a societal totality.
US thinking about gender and organizations has been more influenced by the ethnomethodological conception of gender as an ongoing accomplishment in social life. Joan Acker's (1990) justly famous paper offering a "gendered theory of organisations" established the basic case for seeing organizations as inherently, not accidentally, gendered. Patricia Yancey Martin (2006) over many publications has refined this approach, merging it with a sophisticated theory of gender as social practice. One of the advantages of this approach is that it gives a way of thinking about how organizational gender regimes are repaired after being breached. In this vein Silvia Gherardi and Barbara Poggio (2001) , with an Italian case study, offer an account of the organizational "dance" after the advent of women in a male-dominated organization. Both men and women work to accommodate the new situation, tending to restore the symbolic dichotomy of gender despite many practical compromises.
Some broad conclusions about masculinities and organizations
Though the fine grain of research is often highly illuminating, it is also worth noticing what broad conclusions are established by a whole literature -which we tend to take for granted in individual studies.
In the first place, this body of research has documented the extent to which masculinities are embedded in organizational life. Traditional organization theory may have missed them, but when you go looking with the tools of social science, gender regimes can be found, and mapped, in every type of organization yet studied. They are complex structures involving gender divisions of labour, gender relations of power, gender patterns of emotional relations, and gendered culture. (For my own documentation of this in the public sector in Australia, see Connell 2006 .) Such gender regimes regularly define places for men and associated patterns of masculinity.
The research shows organizational masculinities being constructed and defended by such processes as the exclusion of women -informally in the British white-collar work studied by Collinson et al. (1990) , formally in cases like the Turkish military. Without even being named as gender, a socially-defined masculinity may be built in to the very concept of management or organizational rationality (Kerfoot and Knights 1996) . Everyday organizational life, and the criteria for good performance at work, may define masculine embodiment. We see this on the factory floor where workingclass masculinity is defined in labour that over time destroys the body (Donaldson 1991) . We see it in a different form in offices where middle-class masculinity is defined through strong codes of dress, speech, and deportment (Dasgupta 2003) .
Having recognized the organizational production of masculinity, it is tempting to settle for rather stereotyped pictures of what is produced. I fear that some of the research is over-simplified in this way. (It is possible, in research practice, to focus on the evidence about a main or hegemonic pattern, and so miss variants.) It is important, then, to note a second broad conclusion: organizational gender is not homogeneous. Different masculinities are produced in different organizational contexts, including different units and levels of the same organization, and different masculinities may be produced within the same organizational unit.
Organizational variation was classically shown for the US Navy by Frank Barrett (1996) , who documented the different inflexions of hegemonic masculinity that were found among naval pilots, navigation officers, and supply officers. Mac an Ghaill's (1994) ethnography of a British school describes different patterns of masculinity among groups of high school teachers. Thinking of the military, it is even possible to say that some organizations work by means of relations between different forms of masculinity. The general requires a capacity for sober means-end calculation, and willingness to send other people to die; the front-line soldier requires a certain ability not to calculate rationally, and solidarity with fellow-grunts. The army requires both versions of masculinity.
Part of the variegation of organizations is the different intensity of gender formation processes in different organizational domains. Barrie Thorne (1993) noted how everyday life in a school alternates between situations where gender is strongly marked (e.g. segregated play) and situations where boundaries are crossed or gender is muted (e.g. a teacher addressing a mixed class in gender-neutral terms). I have suggested that we can see some areas of school life for boys as a "masculinity vortex", where masculinity is strongly thematised and may become coercivecompetitive sport, for instance, or the school disciplinary mechanisms (Connell 2000) . We might see prisons in the same light (Sabo et al. 2001) .
A third broad conclusion is the significance of links between institutions, especially between economic institutions and families. In her very illuminating study of women in high-technology corporations, Managing Like a Man, Judy Wajcman shows (like all serious research in the field, and contrary to the claims of pop psychology) that men and women don't operate very differently as managers. But they are in different situations, for one basic reason:
It is at the interface between home and work that gender differences are most stark... The problem was summed up by one woman saying: 'We all need a wife but they only come in one sex.' ...for all the company initiatives designed to promote equal opportunities, the managerial career is still largely dependent upon the services of a wife at home. (Wajcman 1999: 132) The link between home and workplace has of course become a field of public debate in its own right, under the rubric of "work/life balance". Corporations and governments adopt "family-friendly" policies to promote better balance. Whether these policies are having much impact is open to question (Pocock 2003) . Certainly, in the study of managerial masculinities we are currently doing in Sydney, Wajcman's conclusions still hold. Most of the men we have interviewed work a ten-hour day and sometimes more, are focussed on the demands and responsibilities of their work, and rely on having a wife to look after the children and keep the household going. Those managers who want to pursue emotionally-engaged fatherhood -and there are someface real difficulties in making it work.
A fourth general finding concerns the politics of change in organizational gender regimes. In the last generation, as I have noted, states and corporations came under sustained pressure to act for gender equity, and men -across an astonishing range of groups and situations around the world -have felt under challenge from women (Connell 2005) . The research on organizational life through this period has found a spectrum of responses among men.
There has not been (as categorical models of gender might suggest) a unified opposition. Some outright resistance there certainly has been. Consider, for instance, the organized opposition to the ordination of women or gay men in the Anglican and Catholic churches, an international phenomenon. Factional exclusion and sexual harassment are among the tactics of resistance found by Suzanne Franzway (1999) in labour unions. The slow pace of change in organizational gender regimes noted by many scholars can in part be attributed to the actions of men who have the power to inhibit reform (Hale 1996 , Cockburn 1991 ).
But it is also true that equal-opportunity measures have been brought in by reform coalitions that include men, and are sometimes led by men. For instance, union leaders in Canada and Australia have been vital in supporting women's entry to such heavily masculinized work as steelmaking and construction (Corman et al. 1993, Burgmann and Burgmann 1998) . In many situations, equal opportunity and familyfriendly policies now have significant levels of support among men, as we certainly found in public-sector organizations in Australia (Connell 2007a) . Top level corporate and public-sector managers nowadays do not present themselves as heavy-handed patriarchs. They may (and often do) marginalize gender reform, but they rarely oppose it openly, at least in the Anglophone world.
Though this is a little more speculative, it seems likely that the political process around equal opportunity measures is one of the forces for change in organizational masculinity. It is now a required skill in management to get along with female colleagues and subordinates. Contemporary managers often describe their jobs using terms like "guidance", "communication", "negotiation", "solving problems", rather than issuing orders and exercising control. Of course there are exceptions -the names of Trump and Murdoch spring to mind. And some women managers get reputations for toughness and aggression -"managing like a man" can mean taking on attributes of a dominating masculinity. But the more common response to the presence of women seems to be a kind of gender re-negotiation, in which both male and female managers give some ground (for research pointing this way see Brewis 1999, Gherardi and Poggio 2001) .
Difficulties
I now want to address some problems in, or about, the body of research relevant to our theme.
The first concerns a disconnection. Our good descriptions of masculinities -we now have rich ethnographies and discursive analyses from many countries and types of organization -are not well linked to the dynamics of change in the organizational world. That is to say, our descriptions of masculinities tend to be static. Even when the descriptions are formulated in ways that emphasise "fluidity", as post-structuralist research especially does, we do not usually see the process that has produced the fluidity out of an organizational history. The fluidity comes across as a fixed condition. This is a problem encountered in the literature on hegemonic masculinity. This concept was formulated to try to grasp the dynamics of patriarchal gender systems. It proposed a mechanism by which their contradictions were brought under control and gender inequality stabilized -a solution involving consent from the dominated that was never final and in time would be contested. There has been a strong tendency in the literature, instead, to read "hegemonic masculinity" as a static character type, i.e. to psychologise the idea and ignore the question of gender dynamics (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005) .
Of course we need to "fix" the process of history in order to describe a pattern of masculinity at all; that is legitimately done in studies such as Morrell's (2001) superb account of the white boys' schools of colonial Natal. I do not think there is anything fundamentally wrong with our research tools in this field -but I do think they are often used in a way that limits their power. A great virtue of Morrell's study is that it places its historical ethnography of masculinity in the wider context of settler colonialism, family formation and late-Victorian gender order, racial hierarchy and black resistance, and the creation of a local rural capitalism in the context of British imperialism. That is to say, Morrell shows how the institutional construction of a particular masculinity makes sense in a complex, society-wide dynamic of change.
The second problem I want to consider is that the currently most influential approach to gender analysis simply cannot do the kind of job Morrell has done. Deconstructionist and discursive gender analysis, deriving from the thought of French post-structuralists such as Foucault, and mediated particularly through Judith Butler's Gender Trouble, has recently had a considerable influence in research on organizational gender as well as a huge influence in other fields.
The idea of the "performative" character of gender (which does not mean performance as on a stage, but the bringing into being of gender in the process of enactment, as in "performative utterances") is mainly applied to speech acts. This has led to a strong emphasis on discursive constructions of gender -in some of this literature, gender is defined as discourse. It has also led to an emphasis on the fluidity, instability or provisional character of gender identities, as different discourses intersect and people move between them.
As a critique of old-style essentialism, and as a way of emphasising the complexity of gender arrangements and the possibility of change, this is all to the good. It has usefully highlighted sexuality, and the ways in which discourses take hold of the body. As a critique of the heterosexual assumptions of most past discussions of gender, that is to say as queer theory, it has been powerful.
But there are very serious limits to what discursive and deconstructionist gender analysis can do. This approach gives little grip on the political economy of gender, that is to say, the gender structuring of production, consumption and social reproduction processes, which of course now has to be analyzed in global terms (Peterson 2003, Bezanson and Luxton 2006) . It tends to individualize politics, representing opposition to hierarchy mainly as acts of rejection or subversion, rather than group mobilization. And it gives no grip on the structure of organizations -as distinct from discourses about them -or the way organizations operate and change. The basic reason for this, I think, is that the focus on gender performativity treats the production of gender as instantaneous, of the moment, rather than treating it as a deeply-sedimented historical process. It misses what Karel Kosík (1976) called the "ontoformativity" of social practice, the way in which practice brings a social order into existence over time. To put it another way, it misses the downstream consequences of gender enactments, and thus cannot account for the relative stability of gender regimes which is so evident in the equal-opportunity research.
The third problem concerns the political geography of knowledge about our topic. I have emphasised that the research relevant to this issue is now worldwide. But the theory it uses is not. With a very few exceptions, theory in this field is produced in the global metropole -western Europe and the USA. In organizational gender research we cite Foucault, Bourdieu and Weber, we cite feminist theorists from de Beauvoir to Butler, we cite organization researchers such as Acker, Martin, Collinson -and we usually don't stop to think what corner of the world they come from, and what the scope of applicability of their ideas might be.
We presume, that is to say, a homogeneous modernity in which theory can be framed in universal terms. This does not attract attention, because it is the default assumption in contemporary social science. As I point out in Southern Theory (Connell 2007b) , the social thought of the societies in which the great majority of the world's people live is consequently sidelined. It doesn't enter the "mainstream" discussion at all. There are extremely complex issues here; among them, the fact that intellectuals of the majority world are strongly influenced by the metropole. After 500 years of colonialism, and the enormous growth of world trade, telecommunication and migration, we cannot think of the contemporary world as a mosaic of separate cultures. But we also cannot think of the world as just an extension of the EU and USA. An approach to a problem such as "masculinities and institutions" that draws its inspiration and its concepts only from the metropole will not only miss a great amount of experience, it will also be poorer in intellectual terms.
Moving into global space
In his grim analysis of the organizational background to the 1986 "Challenger" space shuttle disaster, James Messerschmidt distinguishes between two organizational cultures -engineering and management -present in the corporation in which the flawed recommendation to launch was made. The managers who made the fatal decision, in pursuit of corporate goals and their own credibility in both class and gender terms, had become more comfortable about taking risks with the weaknesses in the equipment pointed out by the engineers:
That is, MTI managers conflate[d] masculine practices with profit-making practices. Accordingly, risk taking was normalized among MTI management, permitting these men to draw on previously formed risk-taking behavior as a resource for doing a specific type of hegemonic masculinity. (Messerschmidt 1997: 100) .
The conflation of profit-seeking with a certain type of hegemonic masculinity that Messerschmidt identifies here is, I think, a key to understanding masculinities in the modern corporate world. We are not just talking about hierarchies or formal organizations, we are talking specifically about capitalist institutions, created for the accumulation of profit. This is built-in to a capitalist economy, and it is made a reality in organizational life through accounting and budgeting practices. Modern corporations are heavily dependent on ICT no matter what industry they are in, because computer networks allow their accounting to be done quickly and on a large scale.
But the conditions for the accumulation of profit change over time; so the masculinity that was effective for this purpose in, say, the second half of the nineteenth century is not likely to work well at the beginning of the twenty-first. Michael Roper's (1994) classic history of the British "organization man" shows with some precision how the conditions of capitalist production and finance changed over time in the engineering industry, forcing change in the hegemonic pattern of masculinity. In a now-forgotten but very perceptive paper, Michael Winter and Ellen Robert (1980) argued that the form of male dominance in society changed in the conditions of late capitalism, with masculinity increasingly shaped around the norms of technical or instrumental reason. But since that argument was made, capitalism has moved sharply away from the model of administered, rational order, towards de-regulated markets and global competitition. We are now in an era of neoliberalism.
Neoliberalism is usually analyzed at the level of macro-economic policy, as a retreat of the state and unleashing of corporate power -though the state remains active in securing the conditions for the accumulation of profit (Duménil and Lévy 2004, Harvey 2005) . Neoliberalism, however, also works at the level of organizational life, even at the level of personal life, re-shaping our understanding of the social agent. The individual is increasingly understood as a market agent, pursuing advantage in competition with others -a trend that makes particularly relevant, Michael Meuser's (2007) theoretical analysis of the "homosocial construction of masculinity" through competition.
In corporations, neoliberalism tends to produce a fractal geometry; that is to say, a situation where the same pattern is reproduced at successive scales. Each unit is treated (as far as possible) as a profit-maximizing entity in its own right; and even the people are treated as small enterprises. I want to quote from an interview in our current study of corporate masculinities, to show the effects of this at the level of the work group. The setting is an ICT systems unit in the Australian subsidiary of a multinational finance company. Simon is a young middle manager. Some ethnographies of computer workers suggest a lot of independence, but on Simon's floor of the building there is constant supervision, of a particular kind:
We actually start off with a team huddle every morning. Prior to that there is some paperwork the team needs to update by 8.30 every morning. So we produce some KPIs [key performance indicators], or statistics for the performance of everyone in the team for the day before. (So everyone knows everyone else's performance levels?) Yeah, pretty much. It is all there in a spreadsheet for people to see, whether your colleague next to you did only 50% of what they set out to do yesterday, or how many hours they spent doing things.
Here the organizational arrangements construct individual competition and mutual surveillance as a condition of the labour itself. This is not, of course, the only way such labour can be organized. But it is very typical of neoliberal organizations, with their apparatus of "performance management", goals, indicators, incentives, performance reviews and audits.
Neoliberalism has advanced in tandem with the process of economic globalization, and one of the crucial -though least theorized -elements of globalization is the creation of new institutions in transnational spaces. The transnational corporation itself, the international state (e.g. the UNO, the EU), global commodity and finance markets, global communications systems, have all been under construction; and all have gender regimes and are sites for the construction of masculinities.
Some time ago I suggested that we might be seeing in these sites the creation of a new hegemonic masculinity, which I dubbed "transnational business masculinity", uprooted from the old contexts of national gender orders (Connell 1998) . We are beginning to accumulate some evidence from studies of transnational organizations, and so far the data are not in favour of my hypothesis. Alison Woodward (1996) had already suggested that a very conservative version of masculinity was normative in the corridors of the Commission of the European Union in Brussels. Janne Tienari and colleagues (2005) , looking at the formation of a multinational finance corporation by cross-border mergers in the Nordic region, concluded that management masculinity was "constructed according to the core family and male-breadwinner model", in the teeth of Scandinavian public norms of gender equality. Some examples of the hypothesised form of masculinity can be found (Connell and Wood 2005) , and Charlotte Hooper (2000) has documented cultural shifts in business imagery that seem related. But on the balance of evidence at this point, we cannot conclude that neoliberal globalization has shifted the hegemonic form of corporate masculinity in new directions.
The processes of neoliberal globalization, of course, have effects beyond the executive suite. With the destruction of welfare states and the development strategy of import replacement industrialization in the global periphery, there has been a massive rise in economic insecurity for working-class families, and particularly high rates of unemployment for working-class youth. In third-world cities there has been a de-institutionalization of economic life that has left very large numbers of young men in precarious conditions. In the city of Algiers, for instance, they came to be known as hittistes -"those who prop up the wall". In the growing conflict of the early 1990s they were a crucial source of recruits for the extremely violent urban wing of the Islamist rising in Algeria. As Luis Martinez (2000) argues, an old tradition of entrepreneurship through violence could be re-deployed in the new conditions. With obvious differences of religion and culture, something similar may be at work in the high level of informal violence that has persisted in neoliberal South Africa, since the end of Apartheid (Waetjen 2004, Reid and Walker 2005) .
However, as the South African research also points out, a turn towards achieving masculinity through violence is not the only response that men make to dislocation and poverty. Tina Sideris (2005) , for instance, documents a process of change among men in a rural district who have moved away from violence towards more egalitarian, caring relationships with wives and children. What I have said about the involvement of men in reform coalitions applies in poverty as well as in affluence. In this rather more hopeful vein, I would like to end by mentioning the work of two men who, in different ways, changed institutions in the pursuit of gender equality.
Ali Shariati, a theologian and sociologist, was one of the key figures in the Islamic opposition to the Shah's authoritarian regime in Iran (Rahnema 1998) . Thrown out of his university job at the instance of the secret police, he became the director of an organization called Hosseiniyeh Ershad, a centre of Islamic studies in Tehran. Here, at the beginning of the 1970s, he articulated a radical and activist interpretation of Shi'ism in opposition to the conservative clerics. Many of them were hostile towards Shariati, and one of their charges against him was that he allowed women to attend his very popular lectures at Hosseiniyeh Ershad.
Since Western media present Islamic radicalism as mindless, primitive and misogynist, we should take particular note of leaders such as Shariati. His gender egalitarianism was limited in certain ways, but it was principled, and grounded in theory. He derived from the theological concept of tawhid, the absolute unity of God, a conception of the unity of the universe and of humankind, from which he derived principles of race, class and gender equality. Men and women, created with the same nature, have the same entitlement to respect; women too should participate in education and politics. Shariati regarded seclusion and the veil as derogatory, nonIslamic traditions.
The second story comes from India, and is told in Radhika Chopra 's Reframing Masculinities (2007) , an inspiring collection about men's "supportive practices". The story concerns Prince Thangkhiew, a field worker for a non-government organization in the development field. Prince works in a remote and poor area of north-east India, and is largely concerned with micro-credit provision for village self-help groups, mainly of women.
The researcher Subhashim Goswami (2007) travelled with Prince to some of the villages, and watched him making connections with local women, men, and -very importantly -children. Prince's style is far from what neoliberal performancemanagement would require; it is personal, patient, often indirect, though also incredibly energetic, and may take years to produce its effects. Prince seems to have crossed gender boundaries remarkably, being mainly identified with the women in village politics (formally, but not always really, controlled by men). At the coal face, we might say, Prince has transformed the non-government organization into something that is directly accessible to local women and directly useful to them.
In the hills of Meghalaya we are, perhaps, more than a thousand miles from the hard hollow meaningless stare of the LAPD. Organizational life has its exits and its entrances, leading many ways. Some of them lead towards a more peaceful and equal world; in taking those paths, we transform the institutions too.
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